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Abstract
This paper quantitatively investigates equilibrium indeterminacy due to economies of
scale (ES) in nancial intermediation. Financial intermediation provides deposits (inside
money) which can substitute with currency to purchase consumption, and depositing deci-
sions are susceptible to non-fundamental condence (sunspot) shocks. With the interme-
diation sector calibrated to match US data: (i) indeterminacy arises for small degrees of
ES; (ii) sunspot shocks qualitatively resemble monetary shocks; and (iii) monetary policies
can stabilize the real impact of sunspot shocks, but only under complete information. The
analysis also assesses the removal of these shocks on the volatility decline observed during
the US Great Moderation.
Keywords: Financial Intermediation, Inside Money, Indeterminacy, Business Cycles
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1. Introduction
What are the conditions through which economies of scale (ES) in nancial intermedi-
ation gives rise to equilibrium indeterminacy? When these conditions are satised, what is
the quantitative importance of non-fundamental shocks to condence in the nancial sector
on economic volatility? These questions are motivated by two distinct literatures: the litera-
ture on increasing returns to scale in production where indeterminacy delivers belief-induced
business cycles (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer, 1994), and the literature on banking crises where
a strategic complementarity in intermediation delivers multiple (steady state) equilibria (e.g.
Cooper and Corbae, 2002). In contrast to the literature on indeterminacy from the produc-
tion sector, this analysis builds on the empirical evidence of Hughes and Mester (1998) that
banks of all sizes exhibit signicant economies of scale.1 In contrast to the literature on
banking crises, the potential for indeterminacy around a single steady state is quantitatively
assessed in an otherwise standard, business-cycle environment. By combining elements of
both literatures, this paper is a rst attempt at quantitatively examining the signicance of
banking as an avenue through which agentsbeliefs (or animal spirits) can be a source of
business-cycle uctuations.
To illustrate how ES can deliver equilibrium indeterminacy, suppose intermediaries pos-
sess decreasing marginal costs of managing deposits and pass these costs onto depositors.
ES will distort the depositing decisions of the household and provide the basis for a strate-
gic complementarity in the householdsdepositing decisions. If a single household believes
that the deposit holdings of other households will decrease (increase), then her anticipated
cost of holding deposits increase (decrease) and she will hold less (more) deposits. The
sunspot shocks resulting from this strategic complementarity, which can be interpreted as
self-fullling, belief-driven shocks to condence in the intermediary, will inuence the com-
position of inside (deposit) and outside (currency) money holdings, aggregate prices, and
1See Berger and Mester (1999) for references both in support and in contrast to this result. More recently,
Wang (2003) and Allen and Liu (2007) have uncovered modest ES in intermediation.
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potentially real quantities.
The intermediation technology described above is explored in an environment featuring
multiple mediums of exchange (currency and deposits) as in Freeman and Kydland (2000),
nancial intermediaries as in Corbae and Dressler (2009), and nominal wage rigidity. Both
currency and deposits can be used to purchase consumption, and nancial intermediaries
provide the necessary inside monetary component. When banks give rise to equilibrium
indeterminacy, sunspot shocks have a nominal impact because they inuence broad monetary
aggregates which in turn inuence aggregate prices. Nominal wage rigidity links these shocks
to the real economy and delivers business-cycle uctuations.
The results of the analysis are as follows. First, with the size of the intermediary sector
calibrated to US data (a value added of approximately 1 percent of output), indeterminacy
arises for small degrees of ES in the intermediation sector without the need for multiple
productive sectors or unusual parameter values.2 Second, since sunspot shocks and monetary
shocks both inuence the trade o¤ between inside and outside money balances, the real
response of these shocks are qualitatively similar. Third, monetary policies are able to
assuage the real (but not nominal) impact of sunspot shocks, but only when the monetary
authority has complete information. In other words, the monetary authority can o¤set
the real impact of a condence shock when the shock can be fully observed. When the
condence shock is observed with a lag, the ability of the monetary authority to stabilize
the real economy is severely hindered.
The results presented in this paper can be considered a deeper, quantitative analysis of
the qualitative conclusions proved in Dressler (2009a). Using a simple monetary environment
along the lines of Carlstrom and Feurst (2001), the main results of Dressler (2009a) was that
equilibrium indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES in intermediation nor
a large intermediation sector. What indeterminacy does depend on is monetary policy and
2The degree of increasing returns needed for indeterminacy in environments with one sector of produc-
tion [e.g. Farmer and Guo (1994) and Gali (1994)] far exceeds the estimates of Basu and Fernald (1997).
Furthermore, Farmer (1993) shows that indeterminacy arises in cash-in-advance economies only for weak
degrees of intertemporal substitution.
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the determination of nominal interest rates. In other words, models with multiple mediums
of exchange must have equal margin costs of using each medium in equilibrium. The cost
of deposit use is the potential source of indeterminacy in the environment, and the cost
of currency is the nominal interest rate. Therefore, the determination of nominal interest
rates becomes a crucial ingredient in the environment. If the monetary authority chooses
to not target nominal interest rates and allows them to be inuenced by changes in deposit
costs, then indeterminacy from nancial intermediation manifests itself as an indeterminacy
in the nominal interest rate path. When the monetary authority targets the nominal rate,
as in following a backward-looking Taylor (1993)-type rule, the nominal rate (and the cost
of deposits) are realized and indeterminacy fails to arise for any degree of ES.
Given these previously established results, the present analysis restricts attention to mon-
etary policies which are either exogenous or target money growth rates similar to McCallum
(1993)-type rules, and quantitatively explores the degree of ES necessary for indeterminacy
and the quantitative importance of the resulting non-fundamental shocks. The impact of
these shocks are quantied through a calibration exercise using the 1982 adoption of a nom-
inal interest rate targeting rule by the US as a natural experiment (see Meulendyke, 1989,
ch 2). Prior to 1982, indeterminacy from the nancial intermediation sector could impact
economic volatility, but not after. Since this policy change occurred around the time the
US observed a large decline in economic volatility (termed the Great Moderation), the exer-
cise can assess a consequence of this policy change that has not been previously considered.
Depending on the degree of nominal wage rigidity, the model accounts for up to 10 percent
of the decline in output volatility that Stock and Watson (2003) were unable to explicitly
account for in their assessment of the Great Moderation and attributed to other unknown
forms of good luck.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
model dynamics. Section 4 concludes.
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2. The Model and Equilibrium
2.1. The Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is innite. The economy is populated by a contin-
uum of households indexed by i 2 [0; 1] which supply di¤erentiated labor, a continuum of
industries which produce di¤erentiated goods indexed by j 2 [0; 1] with a large number
of perfectly-competitive rms operating is each industry, a nancial intermediary, and a
monetary authority. Each of these agents are described in turn.
Households
The preferences of household i are given by
(1) E0
1P
t=0
tu

ci (t) ; hi (t)

;
where ci (t) is a composite consumption good, hi (t) =
R 1
0
hij (t) dj is labor supply across
industries, and  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate. Composite consumption of household i is an
(Armington) aggregate of di¤erentiated goods given by the CES specication
(2) ci (t) =
Z 1
0
'
1
$
j c
i
j (t)
$ 1
$ dj
 $
$ 1
;
where cij (t) denotes household is consumption of good j, 'j denotes the weight associated
with good j, and $ denotes the elasticity of substitution across consumption goods.
Household i begins period t with amounts of physical capital ki (t) and nominal currency
mi (t). Every household receives an identical lump-sum transfer T (t) of currency from the
monetary authority, and buys and sells nominal bonds Bi (t) which are zero in net supply
(across locations) and earn a gross nominal return 1 + R (t). The household then deposits
di (t) of its capital into a nancial intermediary earning a gross real return rd (t) ; and lends
ai (t) directly to rms earning a gross real return r (t) : Therefore, ki (t) = ai (t) + di (t).
6
Both deposits and currency can be used to purchase consumption. As in the standard
cash-in-advance model, previously held currency balances can costlessly purchase consump-
tion goods. Deposits are chosen at the beginning of the period and pay interest, but bear
a xed real cost  for each consumption good purchased. This cost can be interpreted as a
per-check processing cost.
The use of money balances deliver the conditions
mi (t) + T (t) Bi (t)  R 1
0
1Jm (j)Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj;(3)
Pk (t) d
i (t)  R 1
0
1Jd (j)Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj;(4)
where Pj (t) denotes the price of consumption good j; Pk (t) is the price of capital (and capital
deposits), and Jm and Jd are subsets of [0; 1] which denote the good types purchased with
currency and deposits, respectively. The indicator function 1Jm (j) (1Jd (j)) equals one if a
particular good of type j is a member of Jm (Jd), and equal zero otherwise.
Household i is a monopoly supplier of type-i labor which is sold to all rms. Since
households substitute imperfectly for one another in production, each household sells it
labor in a monopolistically-competitive market: household i sets the nominal wage W ij (t)
to a representative rm from industry j (henceforth, rm j) such that it satises rm js
demand taking all prices as given. It is assumed that the household faces a quadratic cost
of adjusting its nominal wage as in Rotemberg (1982),

2

W ij (t)
W ij (t  1)
  1
2
;
where  governs the size of the real adjustment cost and  denotes the gross, long-run
ination rate.
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The ow budget constraint of household i is given by
Z 1
0
Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj +m
i (t+ 1) + Pk (t) k
i (t+ 1) (5) Z 1
0
W ij (t)h
i
j (t) dj + r (t)Pk (t) a
i (t) + rd (t)Pk (t) d
i (t) +R (t)Bi (t) +mi (t) + T (t)
 Pk (t) 
Z 1
0
1Jd (j) dj

  Pk (t)
Z 1
0

2

W ij (t)
W ij (t  1)
  1
2
dj
where 
R 1
0
1Jd (j) dj

denotes the total cost of using deposits.
Production
There are j types of output produced, and there exists a large number of perfectly-
competitive rms producing each type. A representative type j rm hires di¤erentiated
labor from every household i and aggregates these labor services into a homogeneous labor
input Hj (t) using the CES technology:
(6) Hj (t) =
Z 1
0
hij (t)
 1
 di
 
 1
;
where  denotes the elasticity of substitution between labor types.3
The production technology for type j output is a CRS function of capital and aggregate
labor: yj (t) = f (z (t) ; Kj (t) ; Hj (t)) ; where z (t) denotes the exogenous level of total factor
productivity identical across rms and evolves according to z (t) = z + zz (t  1) + "z (t)
with "z (t)  N (0; 2z). Prots of a representative type j rm are given by
(7) Pj (t) yj (t) + (1     r (t))Pk (t)Kj (t) 
Z 1
0
W ij (t)h
i
j (t) di;
where Pj (t) is taken as given.
3One could easily establish an equivalent environment where an additional production sector aggregates
heterogeneous labor units and sells homogeneous labor units to good producing rms as in Erceg et al. (2000).
Allowing each rm to hire heterogeneous labor is employed here simply to streamline the environment.
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Financial Intermediaries
The nancial intermediary accepts capital deposits from households and grants capital
loans to rms. As discussed above, the benet to saving in the form of deposits rather than
currency is the earned interest rd; while the benet to deposits relative to direct capital
investment is that deposits can purchase consumption (for a processing cost ).
It is assumed that intermediaries have no minimum reserve requirements and therefore
lend all of their deposits.4 The prot function of an intermediary can be expressed as
(8) r (t)D (t)  rd (t)D (t)  C (D (t)) ;
where D (t) denotes aggregate real deposits, and C (D (t)) denotes real operating costs.5 If
these costs are marginally decreasing, the intermediary will exhibit ES. Assuming C (D (t)) =
 D (t)1+, ES arises for any  2 [ 1; 0):
There is free entry into intermediation so that if the incumbent intermediary receives
positive prots, another intermediary can enter and capture the market. Therefore, zero
prots in (8) generates the following average-cost pricing rule
(9) rd (t) = r (t)   (t) ;
where  (t) = C (D (t)) =D (t) =  D (t) denotes average (per deposit) operating costs.6
The Monetary Authority
The budget constraint of the monetary authority is given by T (t) =M (t+ 1) M (t),
where M (t+ 1) denotes the aggregate stock of currency (the monetary base) available at
4The results presented below are relatively unchanged if the intermediary is required to keep a minimum,
xed precentage of deposits in reserves.
5Since the processing costs  are passed on to the households [see equation (5)] they do not appear in
(8).
6Of course, other decentralizations exist such as nonlinear pricing as in Cooper and Corbae (2002). This
would greatly complicate the analysis.
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each location at the end of period t: The currency base evolves according to M (t+ 1) =
 (t)M (t) where  (t) denotes the gross growth rate.
The analysis considers several cases of how the monetary authority chooses  (t). The
benchmark case considers exogenous monetary policy where money growth evolves according
to
(10)  (t) =  +  (t  1) + " (t) ;
where " (t)  N
 
0; 2

. Additional cases consider variations of a money growth rule,
(11)  (t) = E



 (t)


j
 (t)

;
where  (t) = P (t) =P (t  1) ; P (t) denotes the aggregate price level (dened below), and
variables without a time subscript denote their long-run (steady state) values. By considering
alternative values for the ination elasticity, as well as changing the information available
to the monetary authority (
 (t)) ; the model can examine the full interaction of monetary
policy and indeterminacy.
2.2. Equilibrium
Firm js Problem
Since households choose W ij (t) taking rm js demand as given, it is benecial to es-
tablish the model equilibrium by rst outlining the rms problem.
A representative type j rm chooses Kj (t) and hij (t) 8i in order to maximize prots (7)
subject to (6). A prot-maximizing rm equates the marginal product of each input with
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its marginal cost.
fKj (z (t) ; Kj (t) ; Hj (t)) = (r (t)  1 + )
Pk (t)
Pj (t)
(12)
fHj (z (t) ; Kj (t) ; Hj (t))Pj (t) =

hij (t)
Hj (t)
 1

W ij (t) ; 8i(13)
Dening the left-hand side of (13) to be rm js nominal wage index Wj (t) illustrates rm
js demand for type is labor,
(14) hij (t) =

Wj (t)
W ij (t)

Hj (t) ;
which is a typical result of models featuring nominal-wage rigidity (e.g. Erceg et al., 2000).
Household is Problem
Household is problem is to maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), (5) and (14) by choosing
cij (t) 8j 2 Jm; cij0 (t) 8j0 2 Jd; mi (t) ; ai (t) ; di (t) ; Bi (t) ; and W ij (t) 8j taking all prices
as given. This problem can be simplied by solving an equivalent problem where household
i chooses composite consumption ci (t) taking as given a composite price (or price index)
P (t) : Explicitly, household is problem is equivalent to maximizing the expected discounted
value of (1) subject to
mi (t) + T (t) Bi (t)  P (t) ci (t) R 1
0
1Jm (j)'jdj;(15)
Pk (t) d
i (t)  P (t) ci (t) R 1
0
1Jd (j)'jdj;(16)
and (5) with
R 1
0
Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj replaced by P (t) c
i (t). The indicator functions and weights
'j in (15) and (16) keep track of consumption purchased with currency and deposits. While
leaving the details to an appendix, the rst order conditions of this equivalent problem can
be used to dene the price index as a function of weighted good prices, as well as a demand
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for type j consumption given the elasticity of substitution $.
P (t) =
Z 1
0
'jPj (t)
1 $
 1
1 $
(17)
cij (t) =

P (t)
Pj (t)
$
'jc
i (t)(18)
In order to simplify the problem, it is assumed that the di¤erentiated consumption goods
are perfect complements (i.e. ! ! 0) and the consumption weights 'j are chosen to deliver
an ordinal ranking of consumption good types. Letting 'j = 2j so
R 1
0
'jdj = 1; equations
(17) and (18) become
P (t) =
Z 1
0
(2j)Pj (t) dj;(19)
cij (t) = (2j) c
i (t) :(20)
These assumptions result in the price index being a weighting of di¤erentiated prices, and the
demand for each good is its weighted contribution to total consumption. Note the smaller
the value of j; the smaller the contribution good cij (t) is to composite consumption c
i (t).
The nal step in characterizing household is problem is to address the following question:
is it more attractive to purchase cij (t) with currency or deposits? If a household purchases
cij (t) with deposits, the real end-of-period cost is given by

(1 + r (t)  rd (t)) cij (t) + 

=r (t) ;
which illustrates that in addition to purchasing the good, the household gives up the interest
spread (r (t)  rd (t)) by depositing (instead of directly investing) capital and pays the check
processing cost. If a household purchases cij (t) with currency, the real cost is given by
Pj (t) c
i
j (t) =Pj (t  1) ;
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which illustrates that the needed currency was acquired last period. Substitution of (9) and
(20) into these costs and comparing them results in
(21)

1 +  (t) +

2jci (t)

r (t) 1 T P (t)
P (t  1) ; 8j 2 [0; 1] ;
where Pj (t) is replaced with P (t). Equation (21) illustrates that the cost to using deposits
approaches innity as j approaches zero (all else equal). In other words, some consumption
goods are purchased in quantities small enough such that the cost to using deposits ()
outweighs the return. Therefore, dene ji (t) to be a critical good type such that household
i is indi¤erent to purchasing cij (t) with either currency or deposits because they share the
same cost,
(22)

1 +  (t) +

2ji (t) ci (t)

r (t) 1 =
P (t)
P (t  1) ;
and all goods j above (below) ji (t) will be purchased with deposits (currency). This delivers
the subsets Jm = [0; ji (t)] and Jd = [ji (t) ; 1] :
Household is constraint set can now be stated in terms of composite consumption ci (t) ;
the price index P (t) and the critical good index ji (t) ;
mi (t) + T (t) Bi (t)
P (t)
 ji (t)2 ci (t) ;(23)
di (t)   1  ji (t)2 ci (t) ;(24)
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and
ci (t) +
mi (t+ 1)
P (t)
+ ki (t+ 1) (25) Z 1
0
W ij (t)
P (t)
hij (t) dj + r (t)

ki (t)  di (t)+ rd (t) di (t)
+
mi (t) + T (t) +R (t)Bi (t)
P (t)
    1  ji (t)  Z 1
0

2

W ij (t)
W ij (t  1)
  1
2
dj
where ai (t) = ki (t)  di (t). Since composite consumption can be transformed into units of
investment, Pk (t) = P (t) :
Household i chooses ci (t) ; ji (t) ; Bi (t) ; di (t) ; mi (t+ 1) ; ki (t+ 1) ; and W ij (t) ; 8j
in order to maximize (1) subject to (14), (23), (24), and (25) taking all prices and the state
of the economy as given. The transformation of the generalized problem to the simplied
problem, as well as illustrating that (22) can be derived from the rst-order conditions of
the households optimization problem are detailed in an appendix.
Market Clearing and Denition of Equilibrium
Given that all households face the same elasticity regarding their labor demand (), and
all rms are perfectly competitive within their respective industry, we can restrict attention
to symmetric labor and goods market equilibria and treat household i as a representative
household and rm j as a representative rm. Therefore, W ij (t) = Wj (t) = W (t) ; h
i
j (t) =
hj (t) = h (t) ; and ci (t) = c (t).
Goods market clearing is given by
(26) Y (t) = C (t) + I (t) +   +  (1  J (t)) + 
2

W (t)
W (t  1)   1
2
;
where Y (t) =
R 1
0
(2j) yj (t) dj conforms with composite consumption, and I (t) = K (t+ 1) 
(1  )K (t) denotes aggregate investment. Equation (26) states that aggregate output is
distributed amongst consumption, investment, and aggregate nancial and wage adjustment
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costs. Capital market clearing is given by K (t) = k (t).
Currency market clearing is given by M (t) = m (t). A broader monetary aggregate
(M1 (t)) is dened as the nominal sum of currency and deposits,
(27) M1 (t) =M (t) + P (t)D (t) =M (t)

1 +
P (t)D (t)
M (t)

;
where the third equality denes M1 as the product of the currency base and the endogenously
determined money multiplier. Zero-net supply in the bond market results in B (t) = 0:
The decision rules of the households, rms, and pricing functions can now be dened
as functions of k (t) ; W (t  1) ;  (t) (exogenous or endogenous), and the fundamental
shock z (t) : When ES in the nancial intermediary sector delivers equilibrium indetermi-
nacy, it is assumed that agents also base their decisions upon observing a non-fundamental
sunspot or condence shock  (t). Therefore, for all fk (t) ; W (t  1) ;  (t) ; z (t) ;  (t)g,
an equilibrium is dened as a list of prices fP (t) ; r (t) ; rd (t) ; W (t) ; R (t)g and allocations
fk (t+ 1) ; m (t+ 1) ; h (t) ; c (t) ; j (t) ; d (t) ; B (t)g such that: (i) households maximize
(1) subject to (23), (24), and (25), (ii) rms maximize prots, (iii) labor demand is deter-
mined by (14), (iv) the markets for goods (26), currency, bonds, and deposits (D (t) = d (t))
clear, and (v)  (t) =  d (t) :
3. Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis begins with stating the functional form assumptions, model
calibration, and alternative monetary policies used throughout the analysis. A search is
then conducted over a subset of the parameter space for zones where the model dynamics
are either determinate (unique) or indeterminate, and the dynamic properties of the model
under indeterminacy are analyzed. The section concludes with a calibration exercise to assess
the elimination of the non-fundamental shocks on the observed decline in US volatility during
the 1980s (the Great Moderation).
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3.1. Functional Forms and Calibration
The functional forms and parameter values are determined according to the business-
cycle literature (e.g. Cooley and Hansen, 1989) and so the resulting steady state of the
model matches particular long-run properties of the US economy.
The money growth rate (  1) is set to 3 percent annually, and the discount parameter
 is calibrated to 0:99 so the annual real interest rate is roughly 4 percent.
Investment is one quarter of steady state output. With a 10 percent depreciation rate,
the capital stock to annual output ratio is 2.5. The production function is assumed to be
y = zkh1 ; and  is calibrated so labors share of national income is roughly two-thirds.
The parameters governing the evolution of technology shocks (z; z) are respectively set to
0:95 and 0:0076 as in Prescott (1986).
The utility function is assumed to be

c (1  h)1 1 V = (1  V ). The parameter  is
calibrated so a households average allocation of time to market activity (net of sleep and
personal care) is one-third which is in line with estimates of Ghez and Becker (1975). V is
set to 2 which is within the range of results reported by Neely et al. (2001).
The parameter  is calibrated so the average mark-up of type i labor is ve percent as in
post-war US data (see Christiano et al., 2005). The cost parameter governing nominal wage
changes () corresponds to an average wage duration of 3 quarters.7
The benchmark model assumes exogenous monetary policy given by (10) with  and
 respectively set to 0:32 and 0:0038 as in Christiano (1991) and Fuerst (1992). Under
endogenous monetary policy (11), two cases are considered where the elasticity of the money
growth rate to observed changes in ination
 

1 

is set to  0:5 and  0:999, respectively.8 A
third case sets elasticity at  0:5 and assumes that the monetary authority does not initially
observe the sunspot shock ( (t) =2 
 (t)).
Three parameters remaining to be determined are the check-writing cost (), and the
7See Chugh (2006) for a mapping from Rotemberg-style costs to Calvo-style rigidity.
8The normalized monetary policy rule is ^ (t) = 1  ^ (t) ; where a hat refers to percentage changes and
the elasticity is given by 1  . Therefore, an elasticity of  0:5 ( 0:999) results in  =  1 ( 1000) :
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parameters dening the cost of managing deposits (  and ) : Since  is central to indeter-
minacy of equilibria in the model, it is treated as a free parameter and analyzed in the
following section. The remaining two parameters are pinned down so the models steady
state matches the US deposit-currency ratio and the value added of the nancial intermedi-
ation sector. The deposit-currency ratio is dened as dP=m and set to 7. This ratio is close
to the post-war minimum considering that two-thirds to three-quarters of the US currency
base is held abroad (see Porter and Judson, 1996).9 Value added is dened as total bank-
ing costs per unit of output ([d+  (1  j)] =y) ; and serves as a proxy for the size of the
intermediation sector. Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1992) compute the value added from banking
and credit agencies other than banksto be 1:8 to 2:7 percent of GNP for the years 1970 to
1989 (Table 3a). While this value added has undoubtedly changed over the last 18 years,
it is not clear how much of this measure is represented by the simple structure of nancial
intermediaries in the model. Still, this information serves as an upper bound for the size of
the nancial intermediary sector considered here.
3.2. Economies of Scale and Indeterminacy
While a concave cost function is su¢ cient for banks to exhibit ES in textbook models
of banking (e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 1997), it may not be su¢ cient for equilibrium indeter-
minacy in the model because the banking sector is small relative to the aggregate economy
by construction. The equilibrium properties of the model over values of  and the value
added of the intermediary sector are illustrated in Figure 1. The shaded and non-shaded
regions correspond to parameter values which deliver determinate and indeterminate equi-
libria, respectively.10 The gure illustrates that slight changes to the value added of the
intermediation sector e¤ects the minimum (absolute value) of  required for indeterminacy.
9A similar measure was considered by Freeman and Kydland (2000) and Dressler (2007).
10This exercise begins with values of  and value added (used to calibrate  ) distributed over a ne grid.
For each point in this space, the model is solved and the eigenvalues of the system are counted to determine
whether the resulting dynamics of the model are either determinate or indeterminate.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Symbol Description Value
 capitals share 0:3421
 discount factor 0:9900
 depreciation rate 0:0241
& consumptions share 0:3783
V risk aversion 2
 labor elasticity 20
 wage cost parameter 6:03
 check-clearing cost 8:1481e 6
z AR coe¢ cient (z) 0:95
z standard deviation (z) 0:0076
 exog. AR coe¢ cient () 0:32
a
 exog. standard deviation () 0:0038a
 endog. policy parameter  1; 1000b
 banking cost parameter  0:01
  banking cost parameter 1:75e 2
Notes: aValues under benchmark model
bValues under endogenous monetary policy (see text)
For value added roughly between 1:0290 and 1:1504 percent, indeterminacy arises for values
of  where marginal costs are positive and decreasing.11 While the indeterminacy zone il-
lustrated here is for the benchmark (exogenous monetary policy) case, it is identical to the
models featuring endogenous monetary policy.
The quantitative analysis proceeds with a conservative degree of ES and sets  =  0:01:
The minimum value added delivering indeterminacy under this degree of ES is approximately
1:15 percent, which is below the range determined by Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1992). A sensi-
tivity analysis below considers several points within the indeterminacy zone to conrm the
robustness of the model predictions.
11For value added below 1:0290 percent, indeterminacy requires  <  1 and delivers negative marginal
costs. Value added greater than 1:1504 percent delivers negative values for either  or  : Since the deposit-
currency ratio is determined in the previous section, there exists a negative relationship between the size of
the bank and the parameters delivering value added.
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1.029 1.0492 1.0695 1.0897 1.1099 1.1302 1.1504
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q
Percentage of Real Output (Value Added)
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Figure 1: Pairs of value added to nancial intermediation and  which deliver indeterminate
and determinate equilibria for the benchmark model.
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3.3. Model Results
All versions of the model presented above are solved following the solution algorithm
proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). They show that when a model exhibits indeter-
minacy, the rational expectations forecast errors of the economic agents can be decomposed
into inuences from the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks. However, while the non-
fundamental shock can be interpreted as a reduced-form sunspot shock, one needs to make
an additional assumption in order to uniquely identify the transmission of the fundamental
shocks on the forecast errors. The analysis therefore considers both identication schemes
proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide: orthogonality and continuity. Under orthogonality, the
inuences of the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks are uniquely identied by assum-
ing that they are orthogonal to each other. Under continuity, the fundamental shocks are
identied by imposing that their inuence on the endogenous forecast errors do not abruptly
change when the economy transitions from regions of determinacy to indeterminacy. The
benet of considering the continuity assumption is that the dynamics of the model in re-
sponse to the fundamental shocks under indeterminacy preserves properties that the model
dynamics exhibit under determinacy. Therefore, considering both identication assumptions
allows the analysis to assess not only the e¤ect of the sunspot shock on the economy, but
how ES in banking inuences the impact of the fundamental shocks. The solution algorithm
and the use of both identication assumptions are detailed in an appendix.
Benchmark Model: Exogenous Monetary Policy
The response of the model to positive (one-percent) monetary and sunspot shocks are
illustrated in Figure 2. First consider the events following a monetary shock under the
continuity assumption. An injection of currency immediately increases the price level and
leads to an increase in the ination rate. The increase in ination makes deposits more
attractive than currency (i.e. j (t) decreases), and the increase in deposit holdings results
in a further increase in prices because more currency is used to purchase a smaller portion of
20
consumption. Nominal wage rigidity makes it costly to adjust wages as prices increase, and
the decline in real wages results in increases in labor demand and all other real aggregates.
In the period following the shock, prices remain above steady state along with the portion
of consumption purchased with deposits (i.e. j (t) remains below steady state). Real wages
remain below steady state, so real aggregates remain above. Eventually, an increase in the
demand for currency returns all nominal variables to their steady state values. Once the
paths of prices and nominal wages align, the real wage and all other real aggregates return
to steady state.
Under the orthogonality assumption, the initial impact to a monetary shock is qualita-
tively similar to the impact under continuity. Prices, M1, and j (t) illustrate that deposits
become more attractive. ES in the intermediary implies that the shift towards deposits in-
uences the net deposit rate (r (t)   (t)) ; and the initial impact of a monetary shock is
diminished. In the following period, prices decline below steady state resulting in currency
becoming more attractive. As households choose to hold less deposits, the net return to
deposits declines. This results in a persistent shift away from deposits, illustrated by the
persistent increase in j (t) and the persistent decrease in M1. This persistence is only in
nominal variables; the real economy again returns to steady state once nominal wages and
prices align.
The nal set of impulse responses in Figure 2 illustrates the impact of a positive one-
percent sunspot shock. Quantitatively speaking, the real impact of a sunspot shock is approx-
imately one-half the size of a monetary shock calculated under continuity and three-quarters
the size under orthogonality. The reason for these similar predictions stems from the fact
that both monetary and sunspot shocks impact the economy through the householdsliquid-
ity preference and the portfolio choice of cash and deposit holdings. A sunspot shock induces
agents to increase deposit holdings due to a perceived decrease in the cost to intermediating
assets, resulting in deposits dominating currency for a larger portion of total consumption
purchases. The increase in deposit holdings results in an immediate increase in M1 and
21
prices, while the nominal interest rate declines. The decline in real wages again increases the
demand for labor and real aggregates. In the following period, the increase in deposits keeps
the net return high and delivers the persistence in Prices, M1, and j (t) : Although nominal
aggregates continue to remain far from steady state, nominal wages and prices eventually
align so the real economy converges to its pre-shock state.
Figure 3 illustrates the impulse responses of the economy to a positive, one-percent
productivity shock under both the continuity and orthogonality assumptions. As is common
in business-cycle analyses, a positive productivity shock increases real output as well as real
and nominal interest rates. Deposits become more attractive than currency, so there is an
endogenous increase in broad monetary aggregates. The real responses of the model under
the orthogonality and continuity assumptions are roughly identical. This supports the fact
that although indeterminacy is introduced through a real cost, the impact of this mechanism
lies in the nominal side of the economy. For nominal variables (the bottom six panels),
the continuity and orthogonality assumptions result in di¤erent impulse responses. Under
orthogonality, ES in banking implies a larger increase in deposits due to decreasing marginal
costs. A larger portion of total consumption is purchased with these deposits, resulting in a
smaller decline in prices because the households previously held currency balances are used
to purchase a smaller portion of total consumption. Nonetheless, the nominal movements
have no noticeable impact on the real aggregates under either assumption. Since the size of
the nancial sector is small relative to the rest of the real economy, ES in the banking sector
does not add much to real shocks.
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Endogenous Monetary Policy
The dynamic responses to a sunspot shock under endogenous monetary policy are com-
pared with the benchmark model in Figure 4.12
The intuition behind the policy rule (11) is straightforward: with an ination elasticity 
! = 
1 

of  0:5 ( 0:999) ; the contractionary response of the monetary authority to an
observed increase in ination is half (roughly equal to) the size of the observed increase in
ination. As the gure illustrates, an elasticity of  0:5 results in the real response of a
sunspot shock to be roughly half the size of the benchmark model, while an elasticity of
 0:999 results in the real response to be almost entirely diminished. These real responses
can be explained by comparing the nominal responses. In the benchmark model, the real
impact of a sunspot shock occurs when movements in prices and nominal wages result in a
movement in real wages. When the monetary authority observes the response of prices to the
sunspot shock, it alters the discrepancy between prices and nominal wages and e¤ectively
inuences real wages. With an elasticity of  0:999; the monetary authority can almost
entirely stabilize real wages and eliminate the real e¤ects of the shock.
The analysis also considers the case when the monetary authority cannot observe the
sunspot shock ( (t) =2 
 (t)) : This case is di¢ cult to see in Figure 4 because the response is
exactly the same as the response under exogenous monetary policy. Since the sunspot shock
has zero persistence, the ination response is immediate and dies out in the period after the
shock. Therefore, the monetary authority has nothing to observe in the period following the
shock because ination has already returned to its long-run level. In other words, the real
impact has already been felt and any response would no longer be warranted.
12Restricting attention to sunspot shocks implies no distinction between the orthogonality or continuity
assumptions - the assumption only identies the e¤ect of fundamental shocks.
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Sensitivity Analysis
This section briey assesses the robustness of the above results to two key assumptions:
the degree of ES in the intermediary (), and the size of the intermediation sector (quantied
by value added).
To get some sense of  from the data, taking the log of (9) delivers a regression equation,
(28) log (r (t)  rd (t)) = log ( ) +  log (D (t)) ;
where the left-hand side is the logged spread between real lending and deposit rates, while
the right-hand side is the log-linearized version of  (t). The results for estimating (28) over
the full US post-war data and two subsamples are presented in Table 2.13 Considering up to
two lagged dependent variables was su¢ cient to render white noise residuals for all cases. For
the full data sample,  is estimated to be  0:87 and signicantly less than zero. The point
estimate is lower in the earlier subsample ( 5:66); but not signicantly di¤erent than the
full-sample estimate at the 95 percent condence level. The estimate in the later subsample
is signicantly higher than the full-sample estimate ( 0:30) ; but still signicantly less than
zero at the 90 percent condence level. While this simple exercise is far from concrete
evidence supporting ES in the nancial intermediary sector, it provides alternative values of
 to assess the sensitivity of the model.
The model was analyzed under two additional points within the indeterminacy zone of
Figure 1: (Case 1) the degree of ES estimated for the post-war data sample ( =  0:8666)
with the benchmark value added of 1:15 percent, and (Case 2)  =  0:8666 and a value
added equal to 1:05 percent. Together with the benchmark result, these three cases roughly
13The spread between lending and deposit rates was taken to be the spread between the prime lending
rate (series name: MPRIME) and the 3 month Tbill rate (series name: TB3MS), while real deposits were
dened as the sum of M1: demand deposits and M1: other checkable deposits (series names: DD.US and
OCD.US) deated by the GDP deator (series name: GDPDEF). The annualized interest rate data was
transformed into gross, monthly rates, and trends were removed from all variables using the HP lter. All
monthly data was transformed to quarterly by taking three-month averages. The data sample from 1959:1
to 2006:4 is available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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Table 2: Increasing Return Estimates
Data  R2
1959:1-2006:4  0:8666
(0:3139)
0:42
1959:1-1979:1  5:6641
(2:5143)
0:57
1986:1-2006:4  0:3024
(0:1574)
0:36
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
span the indeterminacy zone.
Figure 5 compares the (orthogonal) impulse responses of several variables to a technology
shock (left column), monetary shock (middle column), and sunspot shock (right column).
The nominal variables (M1, aggregate prices, and nominal wages) were illustrated because
these variables change the most across the three shocks. The gure indicates that there
is a large degree of short-run stability in the predicted responses. Across the three cases,
there are no noticeable di¤erences in the responses to a monetary or sunspot shock. When
looking at the models response to a productivity shock, there are slight changes in nominal
variables in later periods. However, for cases which consider a large degree of ES in nancial
intermediation, the reduced cost to intermediation results in a continued decline in aggregate
prices. The decline in prices is larger than the rise in deposits, which results in the decline
in M1 (see (27)). The real e¤ect of the persistent decline in prices is o¤set by an equivalent
decline in nominal wages, which explains the equivalence in real output.
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3.4. The Great Moderation: A Calibration Exercise
While the above analysis compares the impact of fundamental and nonfundamental
shocks of equal size, it fails to consider the relative sizes of these shocks. This issue is
addressed here through a calibration exercise concerning the quantitative importance of
removing these sunspot shocks on the observed decline in economic volatility observed in the
US during the 1980s (termed the Great Moderation).
A brief background of the Great Moderation begins with the observation by Blanchard
and Simon (2001) that the variability (standard deviation) of quarterly real output growth
and ination since the mid-1980s has declined by one-half and two-thirds, respectively. While
it would be impossible to adequately summarize the various explanations to this unprece-
dented observation, Stock and Watson (2003) determined that the Great Moderation was
attributable to a combination of 10-25 percent improved policy, 20-30 percent identiable
good luck in the form of productivity and commodity price shocks, and 40-60 percent un-
known forms of good luck that manifest themselves as smaller reduced-form forecast errors.
As discussed in the introduction, Dressler (2008) explicitly shows that the equilibrium in-
determinacy examined above ceases to exist when the monetary authority follows an explicit
interest rate rule. Since monetary policies other that interest rate rules were in use before
1982, this suggests that non-fundamental shocks might have had an impact before 1982, but
not after. The present exercise therefore uses the policy adoption as a natural experiment to
identify the relative sizes of the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks, and assess their
quantitative importance on economic volatility.
The exercise rst sets out by identifying the reduction in economic volatility that a model
without durable goods, scal policies, and international sectors can hope to explain. The rst
row of Table 3 presents the percentage change in the standard deviation of output (dened
as the sum of nondurable consumption, services, and investment) and prices (dened as the
CPI) in US data before and after the identied break of the rst quarter of 1984.14 Although
14The data for output was constructed as the sum of (i) Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Non-
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the data denitions di¤er from earlier analyses of the Great Moderation, they indicate a 38
percent decline in output volatility and a 63.5 percent decline in price volatility.
The next step is to use the pre-1984:1 data to calibrate the standard deviations of the
three exogenous shocks fz; ; g in the benchmark model. These parameters are uniden-
tied in steady state, so they are chosen to minimize the distance between the standard
deviations of output (1:9287), the monetary base (0:8315), and M1 (1:6176) observed in the
pre-1984:1 data with simulations of the model.15 The calibration exercise was performed for
two degrees of nominal wage rigidity: the benchmark case ( = 6:03) ; and a higher value
( = 11:65) corresponding to a 4 quarter average wage duration. Under the benchmark case,
the standard deviations were calibrated to z = 0:0115;  = 0:0048; and & = 0:0147: Under
the higher ; the calibration resulted in z = 0:0110;  = 0:0048; and & = 0:0136: It is
interesting to note that the standard deviations for the fundamental shocks are rather close
to the benchmark values taken from the literature, and are both smaller than the sunspot
shock. Both calibrations achieved the targeted moments within 0:0002:
Using the calibrated standard deviations of the fundamental and non-fundamental shocks,
simulations of the model with and without sunspot shocks can be compared in order to isolate
the quantitative importance this indeterminacy on the Great Moderation. The results of the
exercise are presented in the nal two rows of Table 3. Under the benchmark degree of wage
rigidity, removing the nonfundamental shocks results in over one half of a percent reduction in
the standard deviation in output and almost a 43 percent reduction in the standard deviation
of prices. Under the higher wage rigidity, the reduction in output volatility increases to over
1.5 percent. The reduction in price volatility between the two degrees of wage rigidity is
virtually unchanged.
durable Goods (PCNDGC96) and Services (PCESVC96), and (ii) Real Gross Private Domestic Investment
(GDPIC96). The data for prices is the Consumer Price Index for all items (CPIAUCSL). The data for the
monetary base was the currency component of M1 (CURRSL), while M1 was dened to be the currency
component of M1 plus demand deposits (CURRDD). All data is seasonally adjusted and available from the
Federal Reserve of St. Louis database for the range 1959:1 to 2007:4. Monthly data was made quarterly by
taking monthly averages, and trends were removed using the HP lter.
15These three moments were chosen to best identify the standard deviations of the shocks. The details
of the calibration exercise are described in an appendix.
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Table 3: Volatility of Output and Prices
Output Prices
st. dev.a % st. dev.a %
Data 1.9287/1.1937 -38.12 1.0194/0.3720 -63.51
Model ( = 6:03) 1.9289/1.9182 -0.55 1.7092/0.9750 -42.95
Model ( = 11:65) 1.9288/1.8993 -1.53 1.6507/0.9499 -42.46
Notes: aFirst (second) entry uses pre (post) 1984:1 data.
While the calculated decline in output volatility appears small, this simple exercise ac-
counts for 2.5 to 10 percent of the observed decline that Stock and Watson (2003) were
unable to explicitly account for (depending on the degree of nominal rigidity). This impact
is rather signicant considering that the sector giving rise to these sunspot shocks makes up
a small part of the economy.
4. Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to quantitatively assess the economic e¤ects of indeterminacy
resulting from ES in the nancial intermediation sector. A monetary model with multiple
mediums of exchange is extended to feature nancial intermediaries which exhibit economies
of scale through decreasing marginal costs to managing deposits. Although the size of the
nancial intermediary sector is calibrated to match US data, the model illustrates: (i) inde-
terminacy arises for small degrees of ES and standard parameter assumptions; (ii) condence
shocks have signicant e¤ects due to the money multiplier, and qualitatively resemble exoge-
nous monetary shocks; and (iii) endogenous monetary policy can stabilize the real e¤ects of
sunspot shocks, but only under complete information. Furthermore, the quantitative impor-
tance of these condence shocks are assessed by asking how much of the decline in economic
volatility observed in the 1980s can be accounted for by the removal of these sunspot shocks.
Conditional on the degree of wage rigidity, the exercise suggests that the removal of belief
shocks by the adoption of an interest-rate targeting monetary policy can explain up to 10
percent of the Great Moderation that Stock and Watson (2003) categorize as other sources
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of good luck.
These results warrant some discussion. While not directly adding to the controversy
in the empirical literature on ES in intermediation, the analysis suggests that the degree
of ES required to give rise to equilibrium indeterminacy can be small and therefore may
be di¢ cult to empirically estimate. Unfortunately, the stability of the quantitative results
with respect to the degree of ES (i.e. the value of ) - which is desirable for the analysis
presented here - makes this model an unsuitable tool for actually estimating . Nonetheless,
the results presented here do suggest that belief-induced shocks to nancial intermediation
can have large e¤ects under some circumstances. For example, this framework may be
useful in explaining the large amount of economic volatility observed in developing nations
where monetary policies presently allow intermediaries to give rise to indeterminacy. This
application is left for future work.
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Appendices
Household is Generalized and Aggregated Problems
This appendix outlines both the generalized and aggregated problems of the household,
and shows that given the assumptions of zero elasticity of substitution between good types
and the specic weighting scheme, they are equivalent.
The generalized problem of household i can be stated as
max
1X
t=1
tfu ci (t) ; hi (t)
+i1 (t)
h
mi (t) + T (t)  R 1
0
1Jm (j)Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj
i
+i2 (t)
h
Pk (t) d
i (t)  R 1
0
1Jd (j)Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj
i
+i3 (t)
266664
R 1
0
W ij (t)h
i
j (t) dj + r (t)Pk (t) [k
i(t)  di(t)] + rd (t)Pk (t) di (t)
+mi (t) + T (t) +R (t)Bi (t)  Pk (t) 
R 1
0
1Jd (j) dj

  Pk (t)
R 1
0

2
h
W ij (t)
W ij (t 1)
  1
i2
dj
  R 1
0
Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj  mi (t+ 1)  Pk (t) ki (t+ 1)
377775
9>>>>=>>>>; ;
where ci (t) =
hR
'
1
$
j c
i
j(t)
$ 1
$ dj
i $
$ 1
: The rst order conditions for choices of cij (t) 8j 2 Jm;
cij0 (t) 8j0 2 Jd; di (t) ; Bi (t) ; mi (t+ 1) ; ki (t+ 1) and W ij (t) 8j are given by
ucij (t)
 
ci (t)'j
 1
$ = cij (t)
1
$ Pj (t)

i1 (t) + 
i
3 (t)

; 8j 2 Jm;(29)
uci
j0
(t)
 
ci (t)'j0
 1
$ = cij0 (t)
1
$ Pj0 (t)

i2 (t) + 
i
3 (t)

; 8j0 2 Jd;(30)
i2 (t) = 
i
3 (t) [r (t)  rd (t)] ;(31)
i1 (t) = 
i
3 (t)R (t) ;(32)
i3 (t) = E (t)

i1 (t+ 1) + 
i
3 (t+ 1)

;(33)
i3 (t) = E (t) r (t+ 1)
i
3 (t+ 1) ;(34)
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and
uhij (t) Hj (t)

Wj (t)
W ij (t)

  i3 (t)
264 (1  )Hj (t)W ij (t)

Wj(t)
W ij (t)

 Pk (t)
h
W ij (t)
W ij (t 1)
i
W ij (t)
W ij (t 1)
375
= E (t)i3 (t+ 1)

Pk (t+ 1)

W ij (t+ 1)
W ij (t)

W ij (t+ 1)
W ij (t)

; 8j:(35)
The aggregated problem of household i can be stated as
max
1X
t=1
tfu ci (t) ; hi (t)
+^
i
1 (t)
h
mi (st 1) + T (t)  P (t) ci (t)
R 1
0
1Jm (j)'jdj
i
+^
i
2 (t)
h
Pk (t) d
i (t)  P (t) ci (t) R 1
0
1Jd (j)'jdj
i
+^
i
3 (t)
266664
R 1
0
W ij (t)h
i
j (t) dj + r (t)Pk (t) [k
i(t)  di(t)] + rd (t)Pk (t) di (t)
+mi (t) + T (t) +R (t)Bi (t)  Pk (t) 
R 1
0
1Jd (j) dj

  Pk (t)
R 1
0

2
h
W ij (t)
W ij (t 1)
  1
i2
dj
 P (t) ci (t) mi (t+ 1)  Pk (t) ki (t+ 1)
377775
9>>>>=>>>>; ;
and the rst order condition for the choice of ci (t) is given by
(36) uci (t) = P (t)

^
i
3 (t) + ^
i
1 (t)
Z 1
0
1Jm (j)'jdj + ^
i
2 (t)
Z 1
0
1Jd (j)'jdj

:
The remaining rst order conditions (with the exception of the multipliers) are identical to
the generalized problem.
Deriving the aggregate price and consumption demand equations begins with the claim
(and verication) that the problems above are equivalent. This claim implies that the mul-
tipliers are equivalent (e.g. ^
i
3 = 
i
3). Use (29) and (30) to solve for 
i
1 (t) and 
i
2 (t) : This
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requires repeated use of (2) and integrating both sides with respect to j:
i1 (t) = ucij (t)
Z 1
0
'jPj (t)
1 $ dj
 1
$ 1
  i3 (t) ; 8j 2 Jm(37)
i2 (t) = uci
j0
(t)
Z 1
0
'j0Pj0 (t)
1 $ dj
 1
$ 1
  i3 (t) ; 8j0 2 Jd(38)
Substitution of these multipliers into (36) results in
(39) uci (t) = P (t)
2664 
i
3 (t) +

ucij (t)
hR 1
0
'jPj (t)
1 $ dj
i 1
$ 1   i3 (t)
 R 1
0
1Jm (j)'jdj
+

uci
j0
(t)
hR 1
0
'j0Pj0 (t)
1 $ dj
i 1
$ 1   i3 (t)
 R 1
0
1Jd (j)'jdj
3775 :
Since Jm and Jd span the set of goods, i3 (t) and uci (t) drops out leaving
(40) P (t) =
Z 1
0
'jPj (t)
1 $ dj
 1
1 $
:
Verifying that the multipliers are equal (and the problems are equivalent) can be done by
verifying that P (t) ci (t) =
R 1
0
Pj (t) c
i
j (t) dj: Using only the generalized problem, replacing
either i1 (t) in (29) with its expression in (37) or 
i
2 (t) in (30) with its expression in (38)
results in  
ci (t)'j
 1
$ = cij (t)
1
$ Pj (t)
Z 1
0
'jPj (t)
1 $ dj
 1
$ 1
:
Raising both sides to the power $; rearranging terms, integrating both sides with respect to
j; and using (40) veries the result and delivers (18).
Under the aggregated problem, household optimization is characterized by the binding
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constraint set and the Euler equations
uci (t)	
i (t) = E (t) r (t+ 1)uci (t+ 1)	
i (t+ 1) ;(41)
uci (t)	
i (t) = E (t)
1 +R (t+ 1)
 (t+ 1)
uci (t+ 1)	
i (t+ 1) ;(42)
uhij (st) Hj (st)

Wj (st)
W ij (st)

= uci (t)	
i (t)
264 (1  )Hj (st) W
i
j (st)
P (st)

Wj(st)
W ij (st)

 
h
W ij (st)
W ij (st 1)
i
W ij (st)
W ij (st 1)
375
+Etuci (t+ 1)	
i (t+ 1)



W ij (st+1)
W ij (st)

W ij (st+1)
W ij (st)

; 8j(43)
and
(44) R (t) = (r (t)  rd (t)) + 
2ji (t) ci (t)
;
where
(45) 	i (t) =

1 + ji (t)2R (t) +
 
1  ji (t)2  r (t)  rd (t) 1 :
Using (9) and r (t) (t) = 1 + R (t) ; it is easy to show that the rst-order condition for the
households choice of ji (t) is equivalent to (22), suggesting that the optimal choice for the
composition of money balances is chosen such that their costs of use are equated.
Model Solution
The solution methodology described in this appendix follows Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) and their extension of Sims (2001). After removing all multipliers from the households
rst-order conditions and imposing symmetry, the normalized system of equations comprising
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the dynamic solution are given by
uc (t)	 (t) 
E (t)
P (t)
P (t+ 1) (t+ 1)
uc (t)

1 +

2j (t+ 1) c (t+ 1)
+  d (t+ 1)

	(t+ 1) = 0
uc (t)	 (t)  E (t) r (t+ 1)uc (t+ 1)	 (t+ 1) = 0
uh (t) h (t) + uc (t)	 (t)

(1  )W (t)h (t)
P (t)
  

 (t)W (t)
W (t  1)   1

 (t)W (t)
W (t  1)

  :::
E (t)	 (t+ 1)

 (t+ 1)W (t+ 1)
W (t)
  1

 (t+ 1)W (t+ 1)
W (t)
= 0
z (t) = z + zz (t  1) + "z (t)
 (t) =  +  (t  1) + " (t)
z (t) k (t)h1  (t) + (1  ) k (t) =
c (t) + k (t+ 1) + 

 (t)W (t)
W (t  1)   1
2
+  d (t)1+ +  (1  j (t))
1
P (t)
= j (t)2 c (t)
d (t) =
 
1  j (t)2 c (t)
r (t) = z (t)

h (t)
k (t)
1 
+ 1  
W (t)
P (t)
= (1  ) z (t)

k (t)
h (t)

where 	(t) =
h
1 + j
(t)
2c(t)
+  d (t)
i 1
: After the above system is log-linearized around the
models steady state, the dimension of the system is reduced by using the bottom ve
equations to remove fc (t) ; h (t) ; j (t) ; r (t) ; d (t)g. The remaining ve equations (and six
identities) comprise the linear rational expectations model and can be represented in the
canonical form:
(46) 0s (t) = 1s (t  1) + " (t) + # (t)
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where
s (t) = [k (t+ 1) ;W (t) ; P (t) ; z (t) ;  (t) ; E (t) k (t+ 2) ; E (t)W (t+ 1) ; E (t)P (t+ 1)]0
" (t) = ["z (t) ; " (t)]
0
# (t) = [k (t+ 1)  E (t  1) k (t+ 1) ;W (t)  E (t  1)W (t) ; P (t)  E (t  1)P (t)]0
Solving the model requires the use of the generalized Schur decomposition (QZ) of 0
and 1: This results in matrices Q; Z;  and 
 such that QQ0 = ZZ 0 = In;  and 
 are
upper triangular, and 0 = Q0Z and 1 = Q0
Z: Dening $t = Z 0s (t), premultiplying
(46) by Q results in
264 11 12
0 22
375
264 $1t
$1t
375 =
264 
11 
12
0 
22
375
264 $1t 1
$1t 1
375+
264 Q1
Q2
375 (" (t) + # (t))
where, without loss of generality, the system has been partitioned such that the lower blocks
of ; 
 and Q correspond to the portion of the system delivering unstable eigenvalues. In
other words, the lower block contains all equations in which the ratio between the diagonal
elements of 
 and  are greater than unity.
This explosiveblock is written as
$2 (t) = 
 1
22 
22$2t 1 + 
 1
22 Q2 (" (t) + # (t)) :
A non-explosive solution of the model requires $2 (t) = 08t  0: This is accomplished by
choosing$2 (0) = 0 and for every vector " (t) the endogenous forecast error # (t) that satises
(47) " (t) + # (t) = 0
where  = Q2 and  = Q2: If the number of endogenous forecast errors is equal to
the number of unstable eigenvalues, then (47) uniquely determines # (t). If the number of
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endogenous forecast errors exceeds the number of unstable eigenvalues, then the system is
undetermined and sunspot uctuations can arise.
Using the singular value decomposition = UDV 0; a general solution for the endogenous
forecast errors is given by
# (t) =
  V1D 111 U 01 + V2M1 " (t) + V2M2 (t)
where M1 and M2 govern the inuence of the sunspot shock.
Assuming  10 exists, the solution of the model takes the form of a law of motion for the
endogenous variables
(48)
s (t) =  10 1s (t  1) +

 10 
    10 V1D 111 U 01]" (t) +  10 V2 (M1" (t) +M2 (t))

:
Setting M2 = 1 results in the interpretation of  (t) as a reduced-form sunspot shock. De-
termining the value for M1 requires choosing one of two alternative identication schemes.
If one assumes that the e¤ects of fundamental and non-fundamental shocks on the forecast
error are orthogonal to each other, then M1 = 0: Otherwise, M1 is chosen such that the
impulse responses of the model (@s (t) =@" (t)) are continuous at the boundary between the
determinacy and indeterminacy regions. Under indeterminacy, the impulse response is given
by
B1 +B2M1 =
 
 10 
    10 V1D 111 U 01

+  10 
V2M1:
For a corresponding determinacy solution, the impulse response is given by
~B1 = ~
 1
0
~   ~ 10 ~ ~V1 ~D 111 ~U 01 ~
where a tilde denotes that a di¤erent point in the parameter space is needed to alter the
model dynamics. To get the indeterminate impulse responses as close as possible to the
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determinate ones, M1 is computed by applying the least squares criterion
M1 = [B
0
2B2]
 1
B02
h
~B1  B1
i
:
This result is substituted in (48) while maintaining M2 = 1:
Calibration Exercise
Let  denote a vector of standard deviations calculated from data, and  () denote
the corresponding calculations from a simulation of the model where  denotes the vector
of parameters to be calibrated. The parameter vector delivered by the calibration exercise
is that which minimizes
( ()  )0 ( ()  ) ;
where  is an identity matrix.
The calibration exercise chooses  to be a 3  1 vector consisting of the pre-1984:1
standard deviations of real output, the monetary base and M1 (the data), and  is a 3 1
vector of standard deviations of the exogenous shocks of the model (the parameters). Note
that minimizing the above expression would be equivalent to a simulated method of moments
exercise if  were replaced by a weighting matrix that corresponds to the inverse of the
variance-covariance matrix of :
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